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Abstract
This paper reviews agricultural research structural and organization changes in western developed countries,
examines new financing prospects for agricultural research, and provides some tentative conclusions about
which organizations are best positioned to provide services for the 21st century. Giventhat these countries
faces many similar economic, political, scientific, andagroclimatic factors and fiscal issues, we canexpect a
similar set of similar new developments thathave potentially important and widespread long-run implications.
After three common developments are outlined, principles ofimpure public good financing are applied leading
to the following agricultural science policy recommendations (i) new political jurisdictions should be formed
to finance research, e.g., new alliances across countries and subregions within large countries, (ii) intellecmal
property rights should be strengthened to increase the total amount and share oftotal (public and private)
agricultural research that is privately financed and conducted, i.e., the private sector should find it profitable to
undertake a large share ofapplied research but not be expected to finance public sector agriculmral research,
(iii) the public sector should redirect its research efforts increasingly to areas that are socially worthwhile but
not privately undertaken, e.g.,in the basic and pretechnology areas, on envkonmental, resources, food safety
and human nutrition, and policy. Finally, large countries that have developed asystem ofshared public and
private financmg and performance and decentralized public support ofagricultural research seem best position
for meeting the needs ofthe 21st century
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Thispaper reviews agricultural research structural andorganization changes in
western developed countries, examines new financing prospects for agricultural research, and
provides some tentative conclusions about which organizations arebestpositioned to provide
services for the 21st century. Given that these countries faces many similar economic,
political, scientific, andagroclimatic factors and fiscal issues, we canexpect a similar set of
similar new developments thathave potentially important and widespread long-run
implications. After three common developments are outlined, principles of impure public
good financing are applied leading to the following agricultural science policy
recommendations (i) new political jurisdictions should be formed to finance research, e.g.,
new alliances across countries and subregions within large countries, (ii) intellecmal property
rights should be strengthened to increase the total amount and share of total (public and
private) agricultural research that is privately financed and conducted, i.e., the private sector
should find it profitable to undertake a large share ofapplied research but not be expected to
finance public sector agriculmral research, (iii) the public sector should redirect its research
efforts increasingly to areas that are socially worthwhile but not privately undertaken, e.g.,in
the basic and pretechnology areas, on envkonmental, resources, food safety and human
nutrition, and policy. Finally, large countries that have developed a system of shared public
and private financmg and performance and decentralized public support ofagricultural
research seem best position for meeting the needs ofthe 21st century.
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The Organization ofAgricultural Research in Western Developed Countries
by Wallace E. Huffinan and Richard E. Just
Agricultural research has been shown to be a socially productive activity and public
agricultural research has been shown to have generally high social rates ofreturn (Evenson 1998).
In western developed countries, agricultural research, both financing and performing, is an activity
shared by the public and private sectors. In particular, organized public agricultural research has been
inplace for a relatively long time in these countries, but the organization and funding situation is not
the same across all of them. In almost all of these countries, a crushing national debt has caused
implementation ofnational-government fiscal austerity that means growing competition for uses of
scarce public funds. These countries also face rapid scientific advances in biotechnology, reduced
pricesupports and trade barriers, and declining enrollments in colleges ofagriculture. This means that
agriculture is facing significant structuraladjustment (OECD 1995). These are major reasonswhy
Western developed coutitries have undertaken a review ofthefunding andorganization of agricultural
research.
The objective of this paper is to review agricultural research structural and organizational
changes in we^emdeveloped countries, to examine new financing prospects for agricultural research,
and to provide some tentative conclusions about which organizations seem to bebetter positioned
to provide services for the twenty-first century. Because western developed countries have similar
political-economic systems, produce similar temperate-zone agricultural commodities, have relatively
well-developed public and private agricultural research sectors, and are relatively open to trade, we
suggest that large national debts, advancing frontiers of science, reduced agricultural college
enrollments, and reduced trade barriers can be expected to lead to aset ofnew developments that
2have potentially important and widespread long-run implications. This paper builds upon recent
assessments of agricultural research policies byHuflftnan andJust (1994; 1997), Alston, Pardey, and
Smith (1997) and Byerlee and Alex 1998. The story unfolds in the following three sections.
Agricultural Research in Western Developed Countries
In western developed countries, the development and organization of agricultural research
has been conditioned by political, economic, resource-environmental, and scientific conditions.
Background on the Countries
The particularwestern developed countries that are the focus of this paper are the two
developedNorth American countries—theUnited States and Canada; fifteen European Union (EU)
countries — Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; and the non-EU country
ofSwitzerland. These 18-countries had aweighted average annual per capita gross domestic product
(ppp measure) in 1992 of$19,500, ranging fi-om a high of$23,220 for theUnited States to alow
ofabout $9,000 for Greece and Portugal (World Resources Institute 1997). For these countries, the
18-country average share of the agricultural sector in gross domestic product was 2.4 percent in
1993. The only countries whose agricultural share deviated by a large margin are Portugal (15%) and
Greece (21%). The share ofthe labor force employed in agriculture is also low with an 18-country
average in 1995 of4.8 percent. Countries within this set that have unusually large agricultural labor
force shares are Spain (12%), Ireland (14%), Portugal (18%), and Greece (23%). These 18 countries
spend asignificant amount on agricultural research relative to gross domestic product produced in
agnculture, an average ofabout 2percent in 1993. These countries have awell developed public and
3private agricultural research ^stem, andtheperformance of agricultural research is spilt about equally
between the public and private sectors (Alston, Pardey, and Smith 1997).
The sizeofagriculture andpublic agricultural researchexpenditures differs greatly across the
18countries. TheU.S. has 420 million hectares ofagricultural land in 1993 (table 1), and the other
17 countries have only 216 million hectares. The largest of the other 17areCanada (73 mil. ha.), and
France and Spain (about 30 mil. ha.). Nine of the countries have less than 5 million hectares
(Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Portugal, Switzerland, Belgium, and Austria).
Theeight largest public agricultural research systems ranked by (ppp) research expenditures in 1993
were: theUnited States, France, Canada, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain
(see table 1). The ranking has dianged some over time; in 1971, Canada wassecond, Germany third,
France fourth, theU.K. fifth, and theNetherlands sixth. The size of the public agricultural research
system in theother ten countries issignificantly smaller. Among theeight largest national agricultural
research systems, the French, Italian, Dutch, and UK. systems are highly centralized infinancing and
administering of public agricultural research, and the U.S. and German systems are most
decentralized. Because ofthesmall size of the smallest ten national systems, they also tend to be
quite centralized in the financing and administration of public agricultural research.
The intensity ofpublic agricultural research differs across the 18 countries, butthedifferences
seem small when intensity is measured relative to the value ofagricultural production rather than per
unit offarm land (see table 2). Using share-of-production intensity, Canada, Norway, and the United
Kingdom stand out as having high research intensities (> 3percent in 1993). Greece, Italy, Austria,
Spain, Ireland, and Switzerland spend very little by this standard (<0.9 percent), but the U.S. also
ranks low at 10*^ among the 18 countries (with 1.3 percent m1993). When research mtensity is
measured as expenditures per unit of farmland, the Netheriands ranks at the top by alarge margin
4($243 per ha. in 1985 prices), andit spends more than twice as muchas the secondbiggest spenders,
Norway ($118 per ha.) and Switzerland ($107 per ha.), The median expenditures for these 18
countries is $30 per ha. in 1993. Greece, Spain, Canada, and the U.S. are ranked at the bottom,
spending only $9-11 per ha in 1993.
The Structure and Organization ofAgricultural Research
In all countries, the national government finances and conducts agricultural research. Since
1984, the £U has also financed a small amount ofjomt or cooperative research in member countries,
but it does not operate any institutions for conducting research. In the U.S. in 1995, the federal
governmentfinanced 56.7 percent ofpublicagricultural research (for USDA research agencies, non-
landgrant institutionsreceivingUSDA contracts and cooperative agreements, and state agricultural
experiment stations and other affiliated state institutions; see USDA 1996). The U.S. Department of
Agriculture conducts research both at centralized facilities in the Washington, D.C. area and more
than 150 research institutions scattered across the country. The agricultural research system
organized under the 50 state land-grant universities is much larger than the research system of the
USDA TheUSDA research agencies spend about one-thu^d and the state land-grant system spends
about two-thirds of the total public agricultural research dollars.
The extentofregional, state, or provincial government financing differs greatly betweenNorth
American andWesternEurope. In NorthAmerica, state or provincial governments have significant
taxing powers and are significant financiers of public agricultural research through agricultural
experiment stations that are primarily part of state or provincial universities. In theUnited Statesin
1995, the fifty stategovernments financed about 32percent oftotal public agricultural research which
are allocated as institutional grants whereas the private sector accounted for a small share of the
funding ofpublic agricultural research (about 9 percent in 1995).
5In Canada, public agricultural research hasbeen largely funded bythe federal government, and •
theprovincial governments provide a small amount ofthe funding (Guitard 1985). Theprivate sector
hashistorically not contributedsignificantly to financing agricultural research in public institutions,
e.g., itscontributionwas estimated to be 15percent of total agricultural and food researchin the mid
1980s. The National Research Council also finances several laboratories located in the provinces,
e.g., the Saskatoon Research Center focuses on oilseed research. The performance of public
agricultural research is primarily by the federal government in 18 research centers (or experiment
stations). The provinces ofAlberta, Ontario, and Quebec also conduct agricultural research. These
three provinces plus British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Nova Scotia support
agricultural research at their provincial universities (Guitard 1985, Carew 1998) They conduct
significant plant breeding, animal science, soil science, and social science research.
The Canadian Agricultural Research Council (CARC), was established in 1974 to provide
broad-based input into the development and coordination of the agricultural research effort in
Canada. The CARC gives national leadership in coordination of the National Agricultural Research
program, for advising on research needs, adequacies and priorities, and better overall program
coordination (Guitard 1985). Public agricultural research funds are distributed to Canadian research
centers by a combination of "bottom-up" and "top-down" approaches. The bottom-up approach
relies on research priorities solicited from producer organizations and provincial ministries of
agriculture. Each federal research center is given a research budget firom Ottawa (National
Headquarters). These funds cover scientists' salaries, equipment, overhead, and non-salary operating
expenses.. Post-doctoral students are financed by theNational Sciences andEngineering Research
Council ofCanada though a competitive process that strives to build partnerships among universities,
governments, and the privates sectors (Carew 1998).
6In Europe, excIucKng Germany, the ta?dng power resides with national governments, and for
the most part regional, state, or provincial governments have limited taxing power. The EU also
collects revenues in three major parts: a tax oh each member country's value-added, a tax on each
member country's gross national product, and EU custom duties and levies against nonmember
countries (EuropeanCommission 1996). A small share of these revenues is allocated to cooperative
research requiring joint participation by institutions in two or more member countries. In 1993, 3.4
percentofEU expenditureswere allocated to research ofall types. The institutions that participate
in these competitively awarded research funds are primarily private companies, public and private
research centers, and higher education institutes (Geuna 1996, 1997).
In France,most public fundsfor agricultural research comefromthe nationalgovernment, and
a small amount comes from about 22 regional governments. All public agricultural research is
planned and administered, in two national institutes — INRA (agriculture) and CEMAGREF
(machinery) — which do not have close links to universities. In the national institutes, the national
government funds scientists' salaries and part of the cost of experimentation. In INRA, the funds for
experimentation come partly from systematic/program funding and partly from competitive sources.
The Central National Scientific Research Institute fijnds research inbiotechnology and other general
science areas. The private sector provides some of the current expense cost of experimentation
through public-private partnerships (Lemarie 1998).
InItaly, public agricultural research is financed primarily by the central government through
theNational Research Coundl, the Ministry ofAgriculture, the \finistry ofResearch and Universities,
and the Ministry ofIndustry and Trade. Regional governments play a secondary role, but a recent
referendum has transferred public agricultural matters from the Ministry ofAgriculture to the twenty
7regional governments (Santanello 1998). In Italy, there is virtually no private sector fiinding of
research m public institutions.
In the United Kingdom, the national government through the Ministry of Agriculture, the
Biotechnology and Biological Science Research Institute (BBSRI), and the Higher Education
Institutes (HEIs) provides most of the public funding of agricultural research. Provincial
governmentsin Scotland,Wales, andNorthern Ireland provide a small amount (Thirtle, et. al. 1997).
The eight regional governments ofEngland, however, provide no fiinds. In 1993-94, the U.K.
government provided about 77 percent of the funding for public agricultural research institutions
(Thirtle, et at 1997). The pro^cial governments provided another 17 percent, and the private
sector provided about 5 percent.^ Public agricultural research is performed primarily in national
institutes and laboratories that are not directly connected with universities. Scotland's quasi-
independent agricultural research institute andstate public funds provided to the Scottish Agricultural
Colleges and Queens University, respectively, are exceptions.
In theNetherlands, all public funding of agricultural research is by the national government,
and public agricultural research is performed in national mstitutes, experiment stations, and
Wageningen Agricultural University. The DutchMinistry ofAgriculture, NatureManagement, and
Fisheries is currently responsible for agricultural research, extension, and education. During 1972-
1981, theNational Agricultural Research Council also played amajor role inpolicy formulation and
coordination. During this period, considerable duplication ofplanning eflforts existed, but in 1981,
the Directorate ofAgricultural Research in the Ministry took charge (Roseboom and Ruttan 1998).
Since 1995, agricultural research policy formation has been assigned to the Directorate ofScience
and Knowledge Transferwithin theMirustry. This Directorate flinds or purchases research primarily
at the National Agricultural Research Department, the Organization for Applied Research in
8Agriculture (largely nine experiment stations), Wageningen Agricultural University. With the creation
of theDirectorate of Science and Knowledge Transfer, theMinistry adopted a unified agricultural
knowledge system covering agricultural research, extension, and education (Roseboom andRuttan
1998). Beginning in 1997, these institutions were integrated under the Knowledge Center at
Wageningen (nownamedWageningen University and Research Center).
In 1986, theDutch government made a decision to dramatically increase private sector
involvement in agricultural research and extension. The private sector is entering into partnerships
with the public agricultural research institutes and is providing either regular or contract research
funds. InSpain, the national government is the source ofmost public funds for agricultural research,
and the 17 state (autonomia) governments have very limited taxing power. In 1993, the central
government provided 61 percent of thefunds for public agricultural research and state governments
provided 34 percent.' The private sector is not involved significantly in the financing of public
agricultural research, accounting for only 1.4 percent offunds for public agricultural research in 1993
(Alfi-anca 1998). The SpanishMinistry ofAgriculture is the primary institution for conducting public
agricultural research, but a few state governments are developing their own research institutes.
Germany provides amajor exception to otherWestern European approaches tofinancing and
organizing agncultural research. The financing ofpublic agricultural research is about 50 percent by
the national government and 50 percent by 16 state (Laender) governments. Very little fiinding of
public agricultural research is obtained fi'om the private sector. Also, agricultural research is
conducted mnational (federal) agricultural research institutes and in university institutes that are
under Laender/states authority. In Germany, agricultural research in federal institutes is federally
funded and in Laender/state institutes is co-financed by the federal and respective Laender
governments. Alarge share ofthe public fiinds is allocated directly to the universities and research
9institutes as institutional fiinding. The federal government also contributes to a system ofresearch
grants that are allocated in a competitive process to scientists, some of which go to agricultural
research (Tangermann 1998).
New Developments in Agricultural Research Policies
Three new developments in agricultural research policies ofwestern developed countries are
notable and important.
Development 1: The rate of growth of public agricultural research expenditures has
been reduced significantly. During 1971-1981, the annual (compound) average growth rate of real
agricultural research expenditures for these 18western developed countrieswas a relatively large 2.9
percent, 3.2 percent for the Western European countries and 2.6 percent for the North American
countries (table 3). For all of the countries exceptGermany, the growth rate was positive. During
1981-1993, thegrowth rateforpublic agricultural research expenditures, however, was significantly
lower by about 1 percentage point — 1.9 percent for all 18 countries, 2.2 percent for the Western
European countries, and 1.9 percentfor theNorthAmerican countries. During this latter period,
three countries (Belgium, Greece, and Ireland) had negative growth in agricultural research
expenditure, theU.K. had no net growth, and Canada had an average growth rate of only 0.26
percent. Overthe two combined periods, Germany has almost nonetgrowth in public agricultural
research expenditures.
The fiinding problems in Germany arise from the federal government and state governments
all reducing funding significantly because ofbudget deficits orfiscal problems mainly associated with
the unification ofGermany. At the Laender level, the reductions are also related to a significant
decrease in the number ofstudents in schools ofagriculture, and the tendency for state governments
to cut resources for research in parallel with the reduction in student numbers (Tangerman 1998).
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Development 2: Traditional national (or central) government funding sources for
agricultural research are reducing systematic funding, including formula or program funding,
and increasingly emphasizing centrally controlled competitive grant programs. This new
direction is especially apparent in theUnited Kingdom and less in theUnited States and Germany.
During 1972-1982, most of the U.K public agricultural research funds were allocated
noncompetitively bytheMinistry of Agriculture, Food, andFisheries on a program basis (Thirtle, et
al 1997). The latestmajor redirection ofU.K. public agricultural research started in 1982. As a
result, some applied research institutions were sold to the private sector, e.g., the National Seed
Development Organization, the Liscombe Experimental Husbandry Farm, and part of the Plant
Breeding Institute. The national government cut ear-marked or programfunding for institutes and
laboratories that were engaged in "near market" and "agricultural productivity enhancing" research
and increased funding for the Higher Education Institutes (HEI) and the Biotechnology and
Biological Science Research Institute (BBSRI). The latter two institutes primarily operate
competitive grants programs in "basic science" and in "public interest" research focused on food
safetyand environmental issues. Scientistsfrom a broad set ofinstitutions are eligible to bid on HEI
and BBSRI projects. In 1993/94, competitive grant fiinds for agricultural research increased to 20
percent ofpublic flinds allocated to agricultural research (but 80 percent continue to be allocated as
program funds or block grants to agricultural research institutions). See Thirtle et al 1997.
In the U.S., the composition of the "regular federal" fiinding (i.e.. Cooperative States
Research Service, CSRS, or Cooperative States Research, Education, and Extension Service,
ESREES) and mechanism for allocating federal funds to the state agricultural experiment station
system (and othercooperating stateinstitutions) have changed.^ In 1887, when the SAES system
was first given formal national government funding by passage of theHatch Act, approximately 82
11
percent of the funding for the SAES systemwere from regular federal funds. This share trended
downward to 65 percent in 1900, 22 percent in 1960, and 14percent in 1990 but were larger in 1995
(15 percent).
Theexact mechanism for distributing "regular federal" fiinds has changed over time (Hufftnan
and Evenson 1993, pp. 21-23; Alston and Pardey 1996, Ch. 2; Committee on the Future of the
Colleges ofAgriculture intheLandGrant University System 1995). Historically a legislated formula
for allocating federal appropriations to the SAES system hasbeen central to national government
funding of public agricultural research. Initially every state received an equal sized national
government appropriation, but over the period 1935-55, theformula was modified to also depend on
a state's share oftotal U.S. ferm population and total U.S. rural people. After strong encouragement
from theNational Research Council, the USDAinitiated a Competitive Grants Program in 1977. Its
funding increased substantially beginning with the National Research Initiative (NRI) in 1986. The
NRI competition is open to all publicandprivate researchers.
In 1900, virtually all of the64 percent ofSAES funding from the national goverrmient came
in the form ofUSDA formula/program funds (Huffrnan and Evenson 1993). While the national
formula funded share ofSAES federal revenue fell to 53 percent in 1980 and 47 percent in 1995
(USDA 1996), the share ofregular-federal fiinds distributed by competitive grants increased from 3.3
percent in 1982 to8.7 percent in 1990 and 15.7 percent in 1995 (Hufihian and Evenson 1993, and
USDA 1996). Hence, "regular federal" funds for agricultural research are being allocated
increasingly by competitive grants and less by formula orblock grants to states.
In Germany, the change in funding ofpublic agricultural research toward more competitive
funding was not the result of a direct but rather by indirect policy. With agradual reduction of
institutional financed public agricultural research, researchers have increasingly turned elsewhere for
12
funding, especially to competitive sources for possible funds, e.g., the German Research Association
whichfunds a broad range ofresearch.
Development 3. Public agricultural research scientists are being encouraged to pursue
nontraditional sources of funding such as outside departments or ministers of agriculture m
national governments and private corporations and producer (commodity or cooperative)
groups. The trend is strongest in the United Kingdom, the U.S., France, the Netherlands, and
Canada. In theUnitedKingdom, the recent redirection of agricultural research funds away fi-om the
Ministry ofAgriculture, Food, and Fisheries to the Higher Education Institutes, and establishment
ofnew statutory bodies (commodity groups) to fund agricultural research represent anew emphasis
on nontraditional agricultural research funding (Smith 1996; Thirtle, et. al. 1997). In 1993/94, the
HEI fiinds represented 15 percent ofexpenditures on U.K. public agricultural research, which was
considerably larger than the 5.5 percent share in 1987/88.
In the U.S. at both the state and federal level, nontraditional sources ofresources and
technology transfer have been developed recently. Over the past two decades, SAES scientists in the
U.S. have turned increasingly to "non-regular federal" and private sector sources. In 1960, the share
ofSAES system flmding coming from nontraditional federal government sources was 7.6 percent,
and it has grown-l1percent in 1980, 12 percent in 1990, and 15 percent in 1995 (see Huffman and
Evenson 1993, USDA 1996). These funds were distributed by the USDA in contracts and
cooperative agreements and by the National Institutes ofHealth, the U.S. Agency for International
Development, theNational ScienceFoundation, the U.S. Department ofHealth and Human Services,
thePublic Health Service, and other agencies primarily by competitive grants.
During the past decade, U.S. federal laboratories have greatly increased the amount of
collaborative research \wth the private sector. The 1986 Technology Transfer Act estabUshed a
13
mechanism, a C^ADA, throughwhichfederal and non-federal researchers could collaborate (Fuglie
1996, p. 55). This legislation permits federal laboratories to enter into CRADA*s with universities,
private companies, non-federal government entities, and others. Theprinciple objective of a CRADA,
however, is to link the pretechnology research capacityoffederal laboratories with the commercial
research and marketing expertise ofthe private sector. Under a CRADA, a federal laboratory may
providepersonnel, equipment, and laboratory privileges. A collaborator with a federal laboratory
may contribute funds directly to a federal laboratory and the cooperating institutionreceives the right
offirst refusal to any joint discovery and maybe given exclusive access to data from ajoint project
(Fuglie et. al. 1996, p.56). CRADA activity has increased rapidly after 1987, but private sector
resources remain an insignificant component of the budget of the Agricultural Research Service of
theUSDA (Cole 1998).
In France, the growth of systematic/program funding for research in national institutes has not
been fast enough to cover the cost of experimentation. Scientists are now encouraged to undertake
cooperativeor joint venture projectswith public (regional governmental) and private sector partners
(Lemarie1998). In theNetherlands, a large increase in the number ofpublic-private partnerships for
agricultural research, including private sector investments at theWageningen University and Research
Center (Oskam 1998). In Italy, funding of public agricultural research by the National Research
Council, Ministry of Industry and Trade, and Ministry of Research and Universities represents
nontraditional sources.
In Canada, since the early 1980s, commodity, producer, processor, and trade associations
havebeen collecting funds for financing agricultural research. Thesegroups include the Canadian
Horticultural Council, the Canola Council of Canada, the Brewing andMalting Barley Research
Institute, and the Canadian and Western Grains Councils (Guitard 1985). However, a new
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agricultural research policy established in 1994, the Matching Investment Initiative (MILL).
Under this program, the federal government matches dollar-for-doUar the private sector's
contributions to joint research ventures. TheMILL was unplemented by the federal government to
offset declinesm federal funding for agricultural research. Also, new funds for public research are
coming from commodity check-oflFprograms forwheat, barley, and beef (Carew 1998).
Although there is clearly mcreased emphasis on obtaining private sector fiinding for public
agricultural research institutions, the share ofthe total funds that these research institutions receive
from the private sector remains small. Amongthe western developed countries, the U.S. seems to
be the leader is share of private sector funding ofpublic agricultural research, 7.0 percent in 1960,
9.2 percent in 1980, and 13 percent in 1995 (Hufi&nan andEvenson 1993;USDA 1996). Private
sector funding ofresearch in public institutions raises a number of political-economicissues that do
not appear in private sector funding ofits own activities.
New Financing Prospects for Agricultural Research
Given the structure and organization of agricultural research and recent developments in
agricultural research policy in western developed countries, this section examines new financing
prospects for agricultural research. The emphasis isonfinancing for impure public goods.
New Political Institutions and Alliances
Some agricultural research produces pure public goods, meaning that innovations are
nonrival (being indivisible) and nonexcludable (being costly to selective withholding). For example,
the scientific discoveries of hybrid com by Shull and East in 1907 and 1908 created a pure
(multinational) public good. The use ofthis technique is nonrival (i.e, it is not used up) and access
to use of the basic idea once it was published is unlimited. Furthermore, because the scientific
15
innovationwas an abstract concept and not embodied in any particular product, material, or process,
it was not patentable. Because oflimited appropriability, the private seaor will not finance this type
ofresearch orw^ grossly underflmd it (seeHuf&nan and Just 1997). Hence, the public sector needs
to play amajor role in the provision ofpure public goods.
Much agricultural research, however, produces impure public goods that are partially
excludable. Access to benefits ofresearch may have ageographical dimension, (e.g., local, regional,
national, or mtemational), usefulness may be limited to particular plant or animal species, or strong
intellectual property rights may be politically, economically, and legally feasible giving owners sole
right to control or license an irmovation's use for afixed period.
Some examples illustrate partial excludability of benefits for scientific mnovations. First,
consider the public agricultural research at Kansas State University that led to anew hard red winter
wheat variety in 1995 that was uniquely adapted to Kansas growing conditions and widely adopted
by Kansas farmers in 1996 and 1997. The new variety replaced some acreage of older hard red
winterwheat varieties in the surrounding states ofOklahoma, Colorado, and Nebraska, but in other
states, the new variety was either not good enough to dislodge older varieties or hard red winter
wheat is not grown. Second, Monsanto discovered and patented aRoundup Ready soybean variety.
U.S. patent law limits the use of this technology for 20 years by other soybean seed producers and
soybean growers, i.e., they must contract withMonsanto for its use. However, because ofimperfect
information about the demand for Roundup Ready soybean varieties, costly and imperfect
enforcement ofpatent rights, and limited patent life, the benefits ofMonsanto's research are only
partially excludable toother firms over the long term. These are practical examples ofmethods by
which partial excludability is obtained.
16
Political and Economic Jurisdictions. Positive externalities or spillovers are commonwith
research and other public goods. When apublic good, say a scientific innovation, provides benefits
outside the political jurisdiction that finances/provides it, and no compensation is paid by outsiders,
positive externalities in the form ofspillovers occur. Spillovers occur when the economic jurisdiction
crosses political boundaries. Foragricultural research (and other public goods), it is important to
distinguish between "political ordeciding" and "economic orbenefitting" jurisdictions (Comes and
Sandier 1996; Olson 1969, 1986). Serious social mefficiency arises either when an economic
jurisdiction isbroader than the political jurisdiction (as above) orwhen the economic jurisdiction is
a small subpart ofa larger political jurisdiction and provision is by collective action (Olson 1969,
1986), i.e., a local public good.
As illustrated by the above review, financing and conducting agricultural research canbe
administered by the same or separate institutions, e.g., can bedone "in-house" or "contracted out."
With public (orprivate) finandng, research can be undertaken by either public or private enterprises.
Mechanisms for allocating research fiinds among enterprises include competitive grantsbased on
research proposals, research contracts, or formula/block grant allocations. The institutional
mechanism for bringing financial resources and the scientific enterprise together differ between the
public and private sectors. However, private firms typically finance and invest in research whenthey
can expect to increase their own profits, especially though the development of new commercial
products, materials, andprocesses. Firms have little incentive to promote the "public interest." For
example, Zucker and Darby (1996) discuss research adjustments and changes in the pharmaceutical
industryresultingfi-om the biotechnologyrevolution. For research to be potentially profitable for the
private sector, innovations must be of a type that can be protected by patents, breeders rights, or
trade secrets.Much agricultural research is not of this type, or if it can be protected by intellectual
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property rights (IPRs), it yields too low arate of return for the private sector to be interested in
undertaking it. Thus, society wUl be better off if the public sector correctly identifies and finances
agricultural research that produces unpure public goods and are not produced by the private sector
optimally.
Some believe central planning, financing, and administering of public agricultural research
according to national priorities is the most efficient organizational structure for providing public
agricultural research. This suggests aunitary national agricultural research system rather than a
federalistic one. The principles offiscal equivalence (Olson 1969, 1986), however, cast serious
doubt on eflSciency ofanational organizational structure. Under the principle offiscal equivalence,
the efficient provision ofpublic agricultural research is achieved when the geographical location of
beneficiaries ofpubUc agricultural research (the "domain") coincides perfectly with the geographical
boundaries ofthe political jurisdiction providing/financing the agricultural research. For example,
federal fimding ofpublic agricultural research projects in the United States would be efficient only
when the boundaries of the benefactors match exactly those of the United States. Such public
innovations are appropriately financed by national tax collections. In all other cases, some other
political jurisdiction would best be given authority for financing public agricultural research.
When public agricultural research produces apure national public good, financing it by one
ofmany states/provinces vwthin the national political jurisdiction is socially inefficient. In this case
research creates positive economic externalities for producers or residents in other states (when no
compensation is paid). When the domain ofthe public good fi-om research innovations is national or
multi-state/province, but the financing is by one subunit, e.g., a state/province, local public financing
will be suboptimal. Thus, when agricultural research produces innovations that are national public
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goods, national government pro^dsion of agricultural research is socially optimal. TWs, however,
does not necessarily imply that agricultural research should be conducted "in-house."
In most "large" countries, however, great geoclimatic, en^^onmental, and/or resource
heterogeneity exist and some locations are much closer to markets than others. Different localities
have acomparative advantage in and specialize in particular different agricultural commodities.
For example, producers in one area may benefit because their profits and comparative advantage in
producing the commodity with new technology is favorably affected, producers in some other areas
may see their profits and comparative advantage erode as aresult ofmarket impacts, and producers
in other areas may be unaffected. For example, the development ofhybrid com has caused com
production in theUnited States to become more concentrated in the Com Belt and for states on the
"fringe" ofthe ComBelt to lose out (see Griliches 1957, 1960; Huffman and Evenson 1993, Chapter
6). Hence, research innovations that are commodity specific will tend to be impure or local public
goods. Furthermore, for many but not all of these commodity-specific innovations, the domain or
location ofbeneficiaries is beyond the control ofthe political and legal system, i.e., they cannot be
effectively protected by patents, breeders rights, or copyrights. In these cases, the exclusion of
nonpayers is also infeasible. Under these conditions, private provision is socially inefficient, but also
public provision by a unitary political jurisdiction, e.g., national government, is also socially
inefficient.
Olson (1986) calls this situation an economic "intemality," because the political jurisdiction
is far larger than the exogenous domain ofthe "local" public good. Here the suboptimality arises
because the social benefits fi-om providing a local public good of exogenous domain can greatly
exceed itscost; butwith aunitary national political jurisdiction, the number oflosers fi'om national
taxes to finance thelocal public good far exceeds thenumber ofgainers firom the irmovation. When
19
public expenditures are decided by collective action through direct or mdirect representational voting,
e.g., majority rule, amajority ofthe population (and voters) will not be in favor offinancing alocal
public good. Although political logrolling and competitive interest group theories (Niskanen 1971;
Mueller 1996, p.82-84) sometime permit a more optimistic outcome to national financing oflocal
public goods, the transactions costs ^d other difficulties ofsuch political outcomes are considerable
(Olson 1986). Thus, when agricultural research produces local public goods, the provision is socially
most efficient when the political and economic jurisdictions comcide perfectly and local political
jurisdictions provide financing. This means that national financing and planning are suboptimal.
With the principle offiscal equivalence, boundaries ofthe political orfinancing jurisdiction
for agricultural innovations should coincide perfectly with the boundaries ofthe beneficiaries ofthat
agricultural research. This means that the political jurisdictions for financing should be formed around
the boundaries of the beneficiaries and not driven by traditional political boundaries, e.g., states,
nations, and may involve amulti-level and possibly overlapping mosaic ofpolitical jurisdictions for
financing agricultural research. Some political jurisdictions might be groups of counties, a state,
groups ofstates, a nation, or evengroups of nations.
Inparticular, with agricultural research innovations providing varying degrees ofpublicness,
theprinciple offiscal equivalence implies that subgroups of countries intheEU should form political
jurisdictions for finandng research thatbenefits their consumers andproducers (but not the producers
and consumers of other countries), e.g., one group might consist of Sweden,Norway, and Finland.
Anothergroup might consist ofSpain, Italy, Greece, and Portugal, and another consist ofDenmark,
the Netherlands, and Belgium. The EU is the appropriate political jurisdiction for agricultural
research that has beneficiaries in all EU countries. The U.S. and Canada seem likely to benefit from
the formationofa new political jurisdiction to finance agricultural research benefitting both of them.
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e.g., spring wheat, swine, beef cattle. It also seems likely that some types of agricultural research
provide benefits across western developed countries, and a new political institution is needed for
financing it.
Switzerland is in a unique position ofbeing a non-EU memberbut being surrounded byEU
members and having a relatively small agricultural sector. This makes cross-country cooperation
moredifficult, and Switzerland is most likely becoming increasmgly a fi'ee or easy rider (Comes and
Sandier 1996) on public agricultural research financed by the EU and EU member countries.
For the countries that are geographically large and agriculturally diverse, e.g., the United
State, Canada, France, U.K., Spain, Germany, and Italy, much ofapplied agricultural research has
local benefits, which implies that regional political jurisdictions, e.g., individual states/provinces, or
groups ofstates/provinces, are the appropriate financingjurisdiction for obtaining efficient funding.
Currently, the U.S., Germany, Canada, and Spain have significant state or provincial government
funding ofpublic agricultural research, and the state agricultural experiment stations are the primary
recipients of these funds (seetable 1 for size comparisons).^ Also, in theU.S., part of federal fiinds
for agricultural areto beallocated for regional research. The 1955 Amended HatchAct requires that
25 percent of regular federal government appropriations for agricultural research be allocated to
regional research, i.e., research mvolving the cooperation of SAES scientists in two or more states
working oncommon research issues. This program, however, does notmeet perfectly Olson's fiscal
equivalence criteria because the political jurisdiction isreally the national rather regional government.
Very little regional government fimding of public agricultural research is occurring in the
United Kingdom, France, and Italy. In these countries, the potential for increased efficiency of
financing public agricultural research would occur ifthe state/provincial governments were to take
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a muchgreater role. Italy, however, seemsto be moving in this direction with the recent referendum
giving re^onal governments authority on issuesdealing with agriculture.
None of these eight large countries, however, have regional political jurisdictions that
effectively span groups of states/provinces for the specific purpose of financing public agricultural
research. We suggest that the creation ofnew regional political jurisdictions having responsibility for
financing agricultural research that benefits their respective residents would be a move toward fiscal
equivalence, greater social efficiency of the fijnding of agricultural research, and increasmg the
funding for public agricultural research. Hence, we suggest an optimal pattern of political
jurisdictions, for finandng agricultural researchwould look like a mos^c ofoverlapping jurisdictions.
It would not be a national government except in small countries.
Clientele and clubs. Some scientific discoveries have beneficiaries that are not defined
geographically, andOlson(1986) suggests calling themthe "clientele" and Comes and Sandier (1996)
suggest callmg them a "club." With public agricultural research funded by collective action, scattered
research clientele (or club members) increases greatly the cost oforganizing to finance agricultural
research, andas the number ofmembers in the clientele group or clubgrows, the free- or easy-rider
problem generally causes the groupto lose it power and to become political ineffective (Olson 1965;
Comes and Sandier 1996). For these clientele groups to be politically effective, theymust solve the
fi"ee-riderproblem.
One effective means of solving this problem is to obtain federal legislation requiring
participation oftarget-group members. In the United States, the 1985 farm bill permitted agricultural
commodity groups to hold a referendum for coverage by mandatory commodity check-offprograms
tofinance commodity promotion and agricultural research. Acommodity group is then designated
to manage the check-off funds, e.g, the National Pork Council, the National Com Growers
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Association, National Soybean Association, National Cattlemen's Association. Also in the recent
round ofU.K. government reforms focused on research, statutory bodies were enabledby national
legislation to impose mandatory levies on agricultural output, e.g., cereals, milk, horticulture, sugar,
apples, potatoes, and meat and livestock, to support commodity promotion and "near-market"
research (Thirtle et al 1997).
Private interest group financing of public agricultural research is socially efficient if (1) allof
the beneficiaries of the research are included in the"group" and (2) the private financing does not
adversely aflfect the amount of public resources allocated to other socially worthwliile agricultural
research, including crowding out other funds. Unfortunately, one or both of these conditions are
seldommet. First, the (potential) beneficiaries ofagricultural research aregenerally much larger than
any particular commodity group (or corporation). Overthe longrun, a largeshareof the benefits of
public agricultural research goes to consumers (see Alston, Norton, and Pardey 1995). In contrast,
a large share of thebenefits of private sector agricultural research goes to the companies financing
and conducting the research. Second, research as a production process has a large amount ofexante
uncertainty and public mstitutions that are under financial distress fi'equently look favorably on almost
any outside source of funding. Thus, a private group isfrequently able to contract with a public
research institute to undertake aproject for less than the expected cost which creates joint public-
private financing. Hence, public fiinds that would otherwise have gone to other.public agricultural
researchprojects are redirected by the joint venture.
From a public interest perspective, the key issue is the size ofthe social payoflFfor the joint
public-private venture versus purely publicly financed projects which are foregone by the redirection
ofpublic resources to the joint venture project. Ifthe opportunity cost is low, then the redirection
is sodally good, but ifthe opportunity cost is high, society is worse offby these joint public-private
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ventures than if no private funding of public agricultural research occurred. In particular, the
opportunity cost may belarge insituations where public funds arenot allocated to different types of
research so as to equalize the expected marginal return.
Ulrich, Furtan and Schmitz (1986) provide empirical evidence shovwng that the social
opportunity costwas high in the case ofjointprivate-public funding of malting barley research m
Canadian public agricultural research institutions (i.e., Agricultural Canada and the provincial
universities). They found that both the public and private sectors gained from the joint venture
funding ofmalting barley research fi.e., private andsocial rates of returnwere poshive), but the social
opportunity costwasveryhigh dueto allowngthedirection ofjoint research in the public institutions
to be influenced to favor the private interests of the malting and brewing industry. The social rate
ofreturn would have been 40 percent higher on the foregone public research to improve feed grain
yields ofbarley (even after compensating the malting and brewing industry for benefits they would
not have obtained from the joint venture).
Hence, increased private funding of agricultural research in public institutions might either
increase or decrease socialwelfare, and might reduce the collectivewillingness of taxpayers to finance
agricultural research in public institutions. Although public research institutions in western developed
countriesare turning increasingly to the private sector for additional financial resources, which may
ease their fiscal problems in the short-run, the consequences may further reduce the willingness of the
public to finance public agricultural research over the long-run and thereby add to the fiscal squeeze
that many public agricultural research institutions are facing.
Stronger IPRs and Stronger Private Incentives
The relative importance ofprivate agricultural R&D in total agriculturalR&D differsacross
thewestern developed countries. When the private sectorundertakes a largerrole in the production
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of scientific innovations, tlie demands on the public sector are reduced and the nature of the social
need changes. The private sector's share is relatively large (> 50 percent) in the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands, United States, Germany, and France but small (<30 percent) in Portugal, Greece,
Ireland, and Canada (Pardey, Roseboom, and Craig 1998; Alston, Pardey, and Smith 1997). Both
governmental policies and market forces greatly affect the incentives for private sector investment
in agricultural R&D.
Publicpolicies have several dififerent types of effects. First, government farm commodity and
agricultural trade policies affect the market prices for final commodities and inputs, the price
elasticities of aggregate supply of agricultural output anddemand for agricultural inputs. Hence,' they
affect the expected profitability offarmers' adopting new technologies and the derived demand for
them. Second, environmental, resource, public health, and food safety policies change the cost
structureoffirms and (or) influenceconsumerdemandfor final products. Third, public investment
in general and pretechnology researchproduces new innovations, and some of them providegood
commercial opportunities for private sector development and marketing. Fourth, national (and
international) laws provide themechanisms for definition, enforcement, and transfer of IPRs(Evenson
1984).
IPRs include patents, breeders' rights, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets. The patent,
which provides protection for embodied inventions, is thekey IPR forprivate sector innovation in
agriculture ofwestern developed countries. Aholder ofa patent on an invention in a particular
country is ^ven the right by the granting country to exclude others fi-om the unauthorized use, sale,
or manufacture ofthe invention for a finite period, generally 20 years. These rights, however, apply
only within the boundaries of the granting country, and only through international patent right
exchange agreementsdo they havevalue in other countries.
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The Patent applicant must disclose or remove from secrecy the essential features of the
invention so as to "enable" others to make or use the mvention (Huf&nan andEvenson 1993,Ch. 5).
Disclosure has two mdn purposes. In returnfor granting a limited monopoly position to the mventor
for 20 years, the nature of the invention is revealed which facilitates accumulation of the stock of
knowledge and exchanges among innovators and scientists, and second, a country establishes strong
incentives for private sectorfinance and conduct ofR&D. Patent lawsgenerally exempt abstract or
non-embodied ideas and concepts from protection. Thus, for an invention embodied in a product,
process, or biolo^calmaterials, the holder of a patent canuse or license its use. This gives the owner
theright to an income stream from thecommercialization of inventions or from licensing it to others.
However, ifa country has ineffective procedures for protecting patent rights, the sizeof the potential
incomestream from inventions is greatly reduced and might be zero.
Patentrights forthe 18western developed countries of this studyhave beenstrengthen over
the past two decades, and this has increased the economic incentives forprivate R&D. The strength
ofpatents across the 18 countries can becompared using a patent rights index developed by Ginarte
and Park (1997). The overall index is derived from five separate indexes for: (1) extent ofcoverage,
(2) membership in international patent agreements, (3) provisions for loss of protection, (4)
enforcement mechanisms, and (5) duration ofprotection. For example, loss of protection means
'working' requirements, compulsory licensing, and revocation ofpatents. Duration is the share of
20 years that a granting country gives protection. Each ofthe five components was given avalue
between 0and 1by the authors for each country and year, and acountry's patent-rights index is the
summation over these values, taking values between 0 and 5.
The values ofthe patent rights index, 1960-1990, for western developed countries are
presented in table 4. First, the mean patent rights index value for the 18 western developed countries
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is significantly higher than the averagevaluefor a set of 111 high, middle, and low income countries,
being 22 percent higher in 1960 and 36 percent higher in 1990. Second, the patent rights index for
the western developed countries has increased rapidly since 1975. The mean ofthe index increased
slowly during 1960-1975 (an average rate of 0.7 percent per year) and more rapidly during 1975-
1990(an annual average of1.1percentper year). Third, theU.S., Austria, the Netherlands, and Italy
stand out because oftheir high patent-rights index values (over 1975-1990), and Portugal, Greece,
and Ireland standout because of their usually low values. Fourth, although most of the western
developed countries have strengthened their patent rights over 1960-1990, the index values for
Canada and Portugal are unchanged and the index value ofGreece actually declined from 1985 to
1990.
Ginarte and Park (1997) have shown that a strong patent rights index is a necessary butnot
sufficient condition fpr^apid economic growth ofcountries. The strength of IPRs is, however, a key
factor in determining the willingness of the private sectorto finance its own agricultural research.
For example, intheU.S. where patentprotection for chemicals is very strong, the private sectorhas
produced as large steam ofnew agricultural chemicals since 1960 (Ollinger and Femandez-Comejo
1995). Also, because new breeders's rights were defined for crop varieties and hence strengthened
by the 1970 PlantVariety Protection Act using Plant Variety Protection Certificates, the rate of.
private sector release ofnew soybean Varieties has greatly increased, and the private seed companies
have replaced public sector plant breeders as the primary breeders ofnew commercially successfiil
soybean varieties (Huffinan and Evenson 1994; Fuglie et. al. 1996, p. 37-39).
Although the patent rights index ofthe western developed countries are generally large, most
ofthe countries have the potential to further strengthen these rights, and in afew countries, e.g.,
Portugal, Greece, Canada, and Finland, the potential is large. In countries where the size of the
27
market is small, the private sector is, however, likely to be less responsive to strengthening IPRs than
in countries where the potential market is large. By having strong IPRs, the private sector can
provide a large share of its own research needs and thereby reduce and change the composition of
the research society needs to finance through the public sector.
Conclusions and Implications
This paper has reviewed some of the important structural and organization changes in
agricultural research ofwestern developed countries and examined new fiinding prospects. Some
conclusionsand recommendations follow. First, new political jurisdictions should be formed for the
purpose of financing agricultural research. These jurisdictions can include new alliances across
countries and subregions within large countries. Small countries should look actively for potential
alliances with other, especially larger countries, that they can join." They are too small, in most cases,
to capture significicant benefits fi'om pretechnology and general science research supporting
agriculture. Furthermore, they should have open markets to benefit fi-om the technically advances
made in other countries. Within large countries, we see no problem with overlapping political
jurisdictions; they have worked well for the provision ofmany other local public goods and services.
Second, intellectual property rights should be strengthened to increase the share of total
agricultural research that is financed and conducted in the private sector. This would make it possible
fortheprivate sectorto provide more of its own research needs, and webelieve that thisis thebest
direction for the private sector resources for research to be channeled. Hence, we are pessimistic
about the potential for private sector financing ofagricultural research in public institutions, except
when private comp^es or groups make unrestricted grants as inRevlon's support ofcancer research
at the UCLAMedical School. Otherwise, private sector financing ofjoint ventures that appear to
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be good opportunities seems likely to come at high social cost. The private interests of companies
and commodity groups are seldom well aligned with the social good or public interest. Thus, joint
public-private research ventures frequently will create a major conflict with the interests of taxpayers
supporting public agricultural research institutions. Furthermore, when flinds are not allocated to
equalize social returns at the margin, joint public-privateventures can come at a high opportunity cost
when they redirect public funds to areas that have a lower (although perhaps positive) social rate of
return. Third, the private sector seldom finds it profitable to invest in pretechnology and general
sdentific research and in public-oriented areas ofapplied research, e.g., research on the environment,
resources, food safety and human nutrition, and agricultural policy. With the private sector taking
on a larger share of the total agricultural research needs, this frees up public fiinds for research that
focuses on pure public goods and other socially important, but privately unprofitable, areas.
Overall, we believe that agricultural R&D systems of "large countries" that havedeveloped
as a system of shared public and private financing and performance and as decentralized public
support ofpublic research institutions, e.g., theUnited States and Germany, are best positioned for.
meeting the R&D needs of their residents in the twenty-first century. These systems are better
positioned to meet the changing demand for local or impure public goods than the national financed,
administered, and conducted systems, e.g., France, and are large enough to obtain many of the
benefits from more basic or pretechnology research. National government agricultural research
frequently operates under the restrictions imposed by funding legislation that ties research
expenditures to particular commodities and particular locations. Small countries can improve their
access tonew technological innovations by forming new political alliances with other countries, being
open to technology transfer, and to imports of technically enhanced goods.
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Endnotes
1. Some Public funds are allocated to support research in the private sector.
2. In theUnited States andCanada, agricultural science policy developed long before general
science policy, and it has continued to be separate.
3. For comparison, the state agricultural experiment stations weregrouped into five six
classes based on their 1992 research expenditures. All the territorial experiment stations
were eliminated, and where a state-had more thanoneexperiment station, the expenditures
were combined. Because of the skewed size distribution, three SAES size groups were
formed for thoseSAES having larger than system average expenditures in 1992, and two
SAES sizegroups wereformed forthose SAES having smaller expenditures.
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Table 3. Expenditures on Public Agricultural Research and Rate of Growth (constant 1993
ppp):- Western Developed Countries, 1971, 1981, 1993
Countries/Region
Level
fS min
Rate ofgrowth (%)
1971 1981 1993 1971-81 1981-91
Western Europe
Austria 19.7 23.0 27.5 1.55 1.49
Belgium 31.4 47.2 36.2 4.08 -2.21
Denmark 35.2 38.3 59.6 0.84 3.69
Finland 23.2 "39.1 64.2 5.22 4.13
France 298.0 410.0 503.5 3.19 1.71
Germany^ 308.6 299.8 332.8 -0.29 0.87
Greece 23.7 49.0 31.5 • 7.26 -3.68
Ireland 29.7 33.9 27.9 1.32 -1.62
Italy 68.3 188.2 360.6 10.14 5.42
Netherlands 134.7 202.1 226.7 4.06 0.96
Norway 32.8 58.0 105.3 5.70 4.97
Portugal 28.3 29.4 59.4 0.38 5.86
Spain 51.0 98.6 214.2 6.59 6.47
Sweden 57.7 81.1 138.3 3.40 4.45
Swiss 34.4 36.6 50.2 0.62 2.63
United Kingdom 274.5 371.0 370.8 3.01 -0.00
Subtotal 1,451.2 2,005.3 2,608.7 3.23 2.19
North America
Canada 354.7 452.3 466.4 2.43 0.26
United States 1,235.6 1,620.4 2,054.3 2.71 1.98
Subtotal 1,590.3 2,072.7 2,520.7 2.65 1.63
Total 18 countries 3,041.5 4,078.0 5,129.4 2.93 1.91
' Only for (West) Germany.
Source: Pardey, Roseboom, and Craig 1998.
expend.\vp/lt/5-20-98
Table 4. National Indexes of Patent Rights, 1960-1990
Country/Region 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Western Europe
Austria 3.38 3.38 3.48 3.48 3.81 3.81 4.24
Belgium 3.05 3.38 3.38 3.38 3.38 4.05 3.90
Denmark 2.33 2.66 2.80 2.80 3.62 3.76 3.90
Finland 1.99 1.99 2.14 2.14 2.95 2.95 2.95
France 2.76 3.10 3.24 3.24 3.90 3.90 3.90
Germany 2.33 2.66 3.09 3.09 3.86 3.71 3.71
Greece 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.32
Ireland 2.23 2.56 2.99 2.99 2.99 2.99 2.99
Italy 2.99 3.32 3.32 3.46 3.71 4.05 4.05
Netherlands 2.95 3.29 3.61 3.47 4.24 4.24 4.24
Norway 2.66 2.66 2.80 2.80 3.29 3.29 3.29
Portugal 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98
Spain 2.95 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.62
Sweden 2.33 2.66 2.80 2.80 3.47 3.47 3.90
Switzerland 2.38 2.71 3.14 3.14 3.80 3.80 3.80
United Kingdom 2.70 3.04 3.04 3.04 3.57 3.57 3.57
subgroup mean 2.60 2.82 2.97 2.97 3.39 3.46 3.52
North America
Canada - 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.76
United States 3.86 3.86 3.86 3.86 4.19 4.52 4.52
subgroup mean 3.31 3.31 3.31 3.31 3.48 3.64 3.64
Mean:
All above countries 2.68 2.87 3.01 3.01 3.40 3.47 3.53
111 countries 2.13 2.22 2.27 2.28 2.40 2.44 2.46
Source: Adapted from Ginarte and Park 1997.
